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SYMPOSIUM
The following Article is a transcription of a symposium program
sponsored by the Student Bar Association at the UND School of Law,
in May of 1970. -- ed.
SOME THEORETICAL AND PRACTICAL
PROBLEMS IN FORMALIZING THE
JUVENILE COURT PROCEDURE
MODERATOR: The Student Bar Association of the University
of North Dakota Law School would like to welcome you to what we
hope to be a continuing program of symposiums on contemporary
legal issues. Tonight's program is entitled, "Some Theoretical and
Practical Problems in Formalizing the Juvenile Court Procedure."
We are most fortunate to have with us a distinguished panel of guests
and University of North Dakota faculty members. The first gentle-
man on my right, Mr. Vaughan Stapleton, is currently a research
associate at the Yale Law School.* Mr. Stapleton received his bach-
elor's degree from Yale University, a master's in anthropology, and
a PhD in sociology from Northwestern University. He has extensive
experience in the field of juvenile delinquency, having been research
director for the National Council of Juvenile Court Judges at the
American Bar Center in Chicago. He was a lecturer at Northwestern
University, where he taught a course entitled "Juvenile Courts and
Juvenile Delinquency." He was also a consultant to the Russell Sage
Conference on Child Development and the dministration of Juvenile
Justice. He has written a number of articles in the field of juvenile
delinquency and is currently writing a book with Professor Teitel-
baum, "In Defense of Youth: A Study of the Role of Counsel in
American Juvenile Courts." Also with us tonight, sitting next to
Mr. Stapleton, is the Honorable A. C. Bakken, Judge of the First
Judicial District for the County of Grand Forks and Juvenile Court
* Presently with the Faculty of Law, Institute of Social Science and Comparative Law.
Hebrew University of Jerusalem.
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Judge for this county. Seated next to'him is Mrs. Myrna Haga, a
Social Work Instructor at the University of North Dakota. She is cur-
rently teaching a seminar with Professor Teitelbaum on "Society
and the Youthful Offender." She has been a staff social worker with
the juvenile courts in St. Louis, and she received her bachelor's
degree from North Dakota and her master's degree from Washington
University in St. Louis. Seated next to her is Professor Teitelbaum,
Assistant Professor of Law at the University of North Dakota.** He
received his LL.B. from Harvard and his Master of Laws from
Northwestern University. Professor Teitelbaum was staff attorney
in the Chicago juvenile court under a Ford Foundation Grant and
has also written several articles in the field of juvenile delin-
quency.***
The format of this symposium will be as follows. After an initial
presentation by Mr. Stapleton, entitled "The Social Scientit's View
of the Gault Decision," each panelist, if he wishes, will have time
for a shorter presentation. After this, questions will be entertained
from the audience. Our only request is that we would like you
to direct the questions to a particular panelist.
I give you Mr. Stapleton-
STAPLETON: It is my very great pleasure to be here. I realize
that in a time of rather dramatic domestic and international upheaval
the problems of juvenile law might seem somewhat unimportant. But
I think that in modern society we are faced with two inescapabl e
problems. One is that there is juvenile crime and that it affects all
of us either directly or indirectly. Certainly I was affected when
my radio was lifted from my car, and those of you who have suf-
fered the indignities of certain juvenile crimes must recognize that
the problem exists in either a minor or major degree. If we take
the word of most experts, it is a major problem in the United States
today.
Secondly, all societies I know of accept the proposition that a
juvenile is malleable. That is why they are called juveniles. A certain
rite de passage is instituted at a given age, depending on the society,
which enables the juvenile to become a full-fledged member of so-
ceity-whether this be at the age of 13, 18 or 21 does not matter.
But there is an age limit before which a juvenile is not accorded
the status of an adult. And- it is further assumed that societies
decree that this juvenile be socialized into the mores of the parent
culture. It is these two assumptions upon which I base my remarks
tonight.
00 Presently Associate Professor of Law at State University of New York at Buffalo.
*** Permission to print this symposium granted by the YAI; IBvrsw or LAw ANP So-
Co.L ACTION.
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Now, these remarks are not those of a person trained in law.
I am, and have been introduced as, a social scientist, albeit one who
has had a long standing interest in law and indeed who has specialized
in the sociology of law. It is in this guise that I want to make some
observations about the Supreme Court's historic decision In re Gault1
which, as you know, granted certain constitutional rights to juveniles.
These rights are the right to counsel, the privilege against self-incrim-
ination, the right to timely notice of charges and the right to con-
frontation of hostile witnesses.
As a social scientist, I am particularly disturbed by the reasoning
on which the majority opinion arrived at its decision, and I will
claim for the purposes of this symposium that the reasoning was
faulty on four basic counts. In its opinion, the majority apparently
based a good part of its decision on four basic social science findings.
They are: (1) that juvenile crime has increased, not decreased, since
establishment of the juvenile justice system; 2 (2) that the label of
delinquency is inherently stigmatizing; 3 (3) that the manner in which
a youth perceives the legal system has profound effects for his
future development, making it incumbent upon the legal system to
present itself in all aspects as a fair and judicious one;4 and
(4) that institutionalization, even for treatment purposes is a form of
punishment rather than of rehabilitation. 5 Let me direct myself to
these points rather briefly. The assumption that juvenile crime has
increased, not decreased, since the establishment of the juvenile
justice system fails to take into account a classic instrument of
social science with which we can determine the positive effects of
given social action-that is, the control group.6 If juvenile delin-
quency has increased, why? Is it because the population has in-
creased? Is it because crime has increased generally? Or is it be-
cause, as the Court assumes in its opinion, juvenile courts have
failed in their duty? The Court does not in its opinion show a com-
parable control group that justifies this proposition. After all, it is
equally plausible, however unlikely it may sound, that juvenile delin-
quency might have increased by a 50% ratio rate had not juvenile
courts been in existence. The Supreme Court fails to state that
proposition. Moreover, the Court supports its conclusion by showing
that a large number of inhabitants of a California juvenile institution
were recidivists, implying thereby failure in earlier processing.
But, again, I ask that the Supreme Court take a look at the total
1. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
2. Id. at 20, n. 6, 21-22.
3. Id. at 23-25.
4. Id. at 26.
5. Id. at 27.
6. See H. ZEISEL, H. KALVEN & B. BUCHOLz, DELAY IN THE COURT 241-42 (1959);
Schwartz & Orleans, On Legal Sanvions, 34 U. CHI. LRV. 274 (1967).
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population of the juvenile court, that is, all juveniles who go through
juvenile court in a given period of time-and ask how many return.
Is this not an equally important fact in determining the rate of
recidivism? We do not know the number of juveniles who have gone
to juvenile court and have never -come back, or whether this is an
accurate indication of whether juvenile courts work or not. I submit
that, in its reasoning, the Supreme Court should have taken this
factor into account.
The Court's second point is that the label of delinquency is in-
herently stigmatizing. It is a dramatic point and it makes a lot of
common sense. But to the best of my knowledge there is only one
empirical study of the stigmatizing effect of the criminal record-
Professors Schwartz and Skolnick's "Two Studies of Legal Stigma"
7 -
where they found that legal stigma has a detrimental effect and
further that it has an effect in terms of the person's future career.
This work goes, of course, to criminal records. To the best of my
knowledge, there have been no similar studies on stigmatizing ef-
fects of juvenile records. Although everyone likes to speak about it,
no one really knows what the effects are. And, indeed, I might argue
that a smart juvenile could logically turn a juvenile record into
a potential asset, by arguing that "I am now 21 years of age
and applying for a job. At the age of 16 I stole a car, but as you see,
I have had a clean record since the age of 16. I have worked to
support my mother, who is a widow; therefore, I can be considered
a rehabilitated citizen of society. And, therefore, I am entitled to
this particular job." What can be so stigmatizing about a record that
could be presented in this way?
More importantly, records are kept on all of our lives. Each of
us in this room has a dossier, possibly in F.B.I. records, certainly
with the Internal Revenue Service, and certainly with the Social
Security Administration. There is an extensive credit record on each
and every one of us. The issue then is not so much the potential
stigmatizing effects of juvenile records, I submit, but the legitimate
and illegitimate use of such records. The Supreme Court's attention
should properly have been placed not on the potential stigmatizing
effects of the records, but upon the probability or possibility of ex-
pungement of such records, so that they could not be used against
a juvenile at a later point in his life.
The Supreme Court's third point-the manner in which a youth
preceives the legal system and its effect for his future development
as an adult member of society-is based primarily on theoretical
work by David Matza, published in a pioneering book entilted Delin-
7. Schwartz & Skolnick, TioQ Studies of Legal StigmG, 10 Soc. PRoB. 138 (1962).
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quency and Drift." He hypothesizes that one cause of juvenile delin-
quency is that juveniles perceive the system as essentially unfair,
and as it is unfair, the juvenile "cops-out." Since he cannot make
it in the system and since the system is not fair to him, he does not
want to have anything to do with it. Matza's book is a fine theoretical
work. It is based on no empirical data. Two empirical studies have
been done about children's perception of the fairness of the system.
One is by Stanton Wheeler on the Boston juvenile courts.9 He found,
by investigating juveniles who have been incarcerated in institutions,
that less than 10 percent perceived their institutionalization as being
unfair. Certainly that is not a high percentage. They do not like
it; there is no doubt about that-but unfair it is not.
The second set of data comes from our own experimental study
of two juvenile courts, 10 where again less than 10 percent of the
juveniles passing through the system, whether they had a lawyer
or not, perceived their treatment by the system as being unfair.
The question of the effect on juveniles of the juvenile court is, I
submit, one for future empirical inquiry.
Finally, institutionalization, even for treatment, is considered a
form of punishment rather than rehabilitation by the Court. This is
perhaps the Supreme Court's most damning argument, and it makes
a great deal of sense because none of us likes to be locked up or even
likes to think about being locked up. At the same time, I can point
to empirical studies from California where diagnosis has been made
of certain types of juveniles which indicate that for a certain maturity
level of juveniles-this is not an age level, but a maturity level
arrived at by psychological diagnosis-institutionalilzation perhaps
has a better therapeutic effect than release to the community, in
terms of future rehabilitation. 1 Carefully controlled studies of semi-
incarceration, half-way houses and mandatory probation indicates
that such forms of treatment do have an effect.
Now I agree that if institutionalization had no effect or a detri-
mental effect, the Supreme Court would have been correct in arriving
at its decision, but, again, the Court did not take a look at opposing
evidence and again I submit that it made an error of fact.
All this notwithstanding, Gault is now the law of the land. What
has this done in terms of the present state of juvenile justice?
The second part of my thesis tonight is that it has taken the burden
from the juvenile court judge and placed it squarely on the shoulders
8. D. MATZA, DELINQUENCY AND DRIFT (1962).
9. Baum & Wheeler, Becoming an Inmatei in CONTROLLING DELINQUENTS 153 (S.
Wheeler, ed. 1968).
10. See N. LEFSTEIN & V. STAPLETON, COUNSEL IN JUVENILE COURTS: AN EXPERiMENTAL
STUDY, National Council of Juvenile Court Judges, Chicago, Illinois (1967).
11. Warren, The Community Treatment Project, in THE SOCIOLOGY OF PUNISHMENT
AND CORRECTION 671 (N. Johnston et al., ed., 2nd ed., 1970).
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of the lawyer. The lawyer's dilemma, as hypothesized in the Presi;-
dent's Task Force Commission 2 and in other writings, relates to his
position at the time of trial in those cases where guilt is known by
the lawyer because the juvenile admits the offense. Does he go before
the court and admit the offense? Does he submit every defense the
law of the land allows to zealously represent his client, as recom-
mended by the American Bar Association Canons of Ethics for
Criminal Cases? I s Does he adopt a quasi-criminal approach whereby
he will defend a client in certain circumstances, but not in others?
We have, as the result of an experimental study of two courts,
code-named Gotham and Zenith--distinctive information on this ques-
tion. 4 I will present the information for one of these cities-Zenith-
a large mid-western city in which project attorneys were able to
have petitions dismissed and their clients completely and freely re-
leased in 54% of their cases. I must emphasize for those social sci-
entists present that the cases were assigned to the lawyers at random;
the lawyers did not have a choice in picking their cases, so they
got good ones and they got bad ones. This 54% dismissal ratio should
be compared with a 40% dismissal ratio in the control group. At
the same time, the project lawyers' commitment ratio was reduced
from 12.2% to 7%.
The real question is, how many of the guilty go free. As part
of the project we had the lawyers fill out case reports. In a full 19
cases out of 188 recorded, although the youth admitted his guilt to
the lawyer, the attorney entered the denial in court. Of these cases,
68% were dismissed outright, only one client was committed and
only three were put on probation. In another two cases, a finding
of delinquency was not entered, but the cases continued for a period
of time after which, assuming the youth's good behavior, the case
would be dismissed.
But the 19 do not stand alone. The 19 must be considered with
another five cases where the youth admitted to part but not all of
the charges facing him. This was usually a multiple-charge case.
In all five, or 100% of those cases, the case was dismissed outright.
What is the lawyer's obligation both to his client and to society?
It might be argued that if these children were young, immature,
or had committed minor crimes, the lawyer's action in these cases
was thoroughly defensible, especially in light of traditional juvenile
12. President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, TASK
FORCE REPORT: JUVENILE DELINQUENCY AND YOUTH CRIME 34 (1967) (hereinafter cited as
TASK FORCE REPORT).
13. See A.B.A. Canons of Professional Ethics, Canon 5.
14. The data which follow are taken from a manuscript by V. Stapleton & L. Teitel-
baum, tentatively entitled In Defense of Youth: A Study of the Role of Counsel in Anerf-
can Juvenile Courts. The manuscript was supported by Russell Sage Grant No. 9470-42-
55646.
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court philosophy where we want to give the kid every break. But
I report from the written report:
A profile of Zenith's 19 cases of full denial in the face of
the youth's full admission sheds considerable doubt on the
hypothesis that the youths were fully innocent. Only two of
these cases could be considered in the younger 10-12 age range,
while the majority fell into the 13-14 age range. Neither were
the offenses committed either minor or juvenile in nature. All
offenses would have been classified as felonies if the offender
had been an adult. Of the 19, we recorded three as crimes
against persons, seven as possession of a deadly weapon, eight
as crimes against property, and one final case logged as pos-
session of marijuana. Nor apparently can these youths be
exculpated by virtue of spotless records. Less than half, 42%
had no prior record of any kind. Five had prior police records,
three were currently on probation, and an equal number had
prior juvenile court records but were not put on probation
at the time of the filing of the petition. As a consequence of
the lawyer's legal action, we recorded the following: in a sep-
arate tabulation of the reasons for the findings we note that
only one of the youths was committed and three placed on
probation. The power of the project attorneys to invoke the
adversary system was apparent in examination of the reason
for dismissal of the remaining 13 cases. The state was unable
to prove six of those cases [remember the lawyer had knowl-
edge of absolute guilt, this is the Zenith 19, not the full 24
cases where the child admitted the entire offense]; four
cases were dismissed due to the failure of necessary witnesses
to show up for adjudicatory hearing, a motion to dismiss
was entered and granted by the court. Finally, the State did
not choose to prosecute in the remaining three cases.
Now in presenting every defense that the law of the land permits,
I submit that the Zenith attorneys were fully within the range of the
Canons of Ethics as they apply in criminal cases. But what about
juvenile cases; do they really apply? The Gault decision has placed
the lawyer, I think, in the uncomfortable role, involving a decision
that does not go only to the potential rehabilitation effects of the
juvenile court but also may suggest a duty to the social order.
Should known delinquents be released?
We have a case in point. It is illustrative of the problem. I submit
that it is not an unusual case. C. W. was a 13-year old with a prior
station house record of 18 arrests for curfew, burglary, and two prior
court referrals for burglary for which he was on pobation at the
time of an additional filing for burglary. Between the time of the
project attorney's taking of the case and the initial adjudicatory
hearing, C. W. was arrested again-for criminal trespass to an auto.
In presenting his case, the defense counsel was able to persuade
the prosecutor that the State did not have sufficient evidence to
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uphold the second charge of criminal trespass to an auto. The initial
petition later was also dismissed, much to the probation officer's
dismay, through the use of a legal technicality-the complaining
witness was an invalid and being housebound, could not appear in
court to testify to the allegation of burglary from her home. The
judge granted a dismissal of the case.
Now it is clear that our Zenith attorney was quite successful
from his client's point of view in obtaining C. W.'s release. We do
not know the future career of C. W. The project 'ended shortly there-
after. I submit that on common sense terms and on any predictability
scale, C. W. is going to get into trouble in the very near future. It is
also revealed in the case report that the attorney was somewhat
disturbed by his action, and I quote from the case report (I think
it is a most revealing quote): "It might also be added that the com-
fortable bromide in these circumstances 'home is as good as any-
thing' may not be acceptable either. There seems no real doubt that
Mrs. W is an alcoholic and that the home circumstances are very
close to intolerable. None of the children go to school, because
Mrs. W is now living with a sister of hers and does not want to
enroll the children and then have them transferred. At the same
time, she has been with this sister for some six to eight months,
and according to the probation officer has taken no steps toward
moving, however often she asserts that she intends to do so in the
near future. It is his belief that she really has no plans for moving
in the near future, and that as a result the children are not going
to go to school. The apartment in which they are living is very badly
overcrowded; the living conditions are pretty close to intolerable.
One may further ask whether the simple fact that C. went to school
would be meaningful. He. claims physical distress while attending
classes, including ringing in his ears; and there is every reason to
believe that he is subject to some rather vicious teasing because
of a scar on his head. Further, his IQ is right around the mental
retardation level, and his performance is severely handicapped by
his emotional difficulties. To the best of my knowledge there is no
institution within the control of the Board of Education which is
suited to a boy with his difficulties; and, as observed above, it does
not seem that there is any [State] institution which is suited as
a practical matter to his needs."
I ask of the symposium, what should the duty of the attorney
be? This is a practical and pressing problem, for if in 12% of the
cases which appear before a major juvenile court we have knowledge
of guilt and the lawyer is able to get approximately 78% of those
cases dismissed completely, we submit not only an obligation to the
child but also to the state of possible damaging results.
As my final point tonight, I would like to entertain the thesis
294
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that there is a possible solution to the lawyer's dilemma. I call for
resolution of this problem in two stages. First, a preadjudication
hearing in which social science testimony is presented. There is pres-
edent for this in the President's Task Force Report on Juvenile Delin-
quency, which calls for pre-judicial dispositions which should be made
as early in the course of official agency contact as possible.15 An
ideal research design in such a case-and here is where I call upon
an ideology which may be equally obnoxious to social scientists and
lawyers alike but will go a long way towards helping resolve the
problem in the future-is to have a design where 50 cases such as
C. W. are accorded the full treatment of the criminal due process
model. In other words, their lawyers will react in the same way that
the Zenith lawyers react. The lawyers will act in the full adversarial
manner.
In another 50 cases the lawyer fully admits the involve-
ment and leaves the child to the mercies of the juvenile court and
whatever treatment facilities it has. A final 50 cases would be sub-
jected to a pretrial hearing where conflicting social science testi-
mony would be brought to bear. Individual experts would be brought
in. A decision would be made on the amenability of treatment
of C. W. or cases like him to various rehabilitation programs. If such
programs were available, it would then be the lawyer's affirmative
duty to go before the juvenile court and admit, suggesting that the
juvenile court withhold jurisdiction for the cases of treatment. If
such treatment were not available within the regular state regulation,
I place an affirmative obligation upon the attorney to subject the
state to legal action. What that legal action is I leave to the lawyer.
To enjoin upon the state treatment facilities for this child, either
through the Board of Education or the state juvenile delinquency
authority or through the proposed youth boards as suggested by the
President's Task Force. The-cases in each group would, of course,
be randomly assigned.
The second portion of this solution envisions a state statute
which enables a juvenile court to withhold a delinquency finding for
the purposes of treatment; and if treatment is shown to be effective,
no delinquency finding is entered, thus removing any possibility of
stigmatizing effects on the record. Further, adequate expungement
facilities should be provided for those cases which are found delin-
quent but later show effects of treatment, so the juvenile can expunge
his record and claim that he has never been in juvenile court.
It is a radical program, but I submit that we are all part of an
experimental and record-keeping society, 16 and that we owe to our-
15. TASK FORCz REPORT 18-19 (1967).
16. See D. Campbell. Reform a Experiment 24 AMER. PSTCHOLOOIsT 409 (1969).
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selves and especialily to the juveniles who come before the nation's
juvenile courts the opportunity for this kind of experimental treat-
ment. After all, it is not so different from what middle class delin-
quency treatment is right now. We might be hypothesizing that we are
offering to the poor-and the poor are the recipients of the nation's
juvenile court services-the same rehabilitative services that are
now available to the middle and upper classes. That is, if a middle
class child is found to be in trouble, he goes to the police station.
Daddy goes down to the police station and says, "Please don't
send him to the juvenile court; I will provide for him going to Taft
Military School" or "I will provide for him going to the Windsor
Mountain School" (for psychiatrically disturbed children). And the
police and the court hold off their judgment because the individual
parent has taken the responsibility upon himself to provide affirma-
tive action on behalf of that juvenile.
Why, I ask, of this symposium and of my fellow panelists, cannot
the law enjoin upon the state the same type of affirmative action?
I thank you.
JUDGE BAKKEN: What I always remember about the Gault
decision is a statement by Justice Fortas, who wrote the opinion,
that the juvenile receives the "worst of both worlds,' 7 which
in the reasoning back of the decision, now makes it necessary to
extend at least the minimum of due process to the juveniles. Prior
to this decision the doctrine of parens patriae was followed exclusively
in my experience, and I am sure this was generallly true throughout
the country-which really means that the court takes the position
of knowing what is best, and the juvenile was encouraged to disclose
all and the court would then, within the limits of the alternatives,
select whatever corrective action it though best in this situation.
Of course, that still exists, and the alternatives are, in my experience,
too limited in many respects; but I really do feel that in North Dakota
we have gained by the result of the Gault decision. In fact, I think
it is safe to say that passage of the Uniform Juvenile Court Acts,
which was adopted by the 1969 legislature, s was brought about at
this early date mainly by the Gault decision.
I was a State's attorney for about ten years in two counties in
North Dakota-these were smaller counties-and one thing I found,
and it disturbed me, was that there was very little uniformity in
juvenile court proceedings. At that time we had what we called
Juvenile Commissioners-the name was changed to Juvenile Super-
visors in the new Juvenile Court Act. These Juvenile Commissioners
17. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 18, n. 23 (1967), quoting Kent v. United States, 383 U.S.
541, 556 (1966).
18. N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-20-01 et seq. (Supp. 1969).
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had no specific requirements as to qualifications; we would find in
many cases they would come out of education, retired school educa-
tors, and, even though they had experience in dealing with students,
many of the problems that faced them in dealing with delinquent
students or juveniles were something quite different. I was disappoint-
ed many times by the lack of uniformity and lack of professionalism
that existed. I think we still have that problem to some degree in
the smaller counties, but I certainly found here in Grand Forks
County there is a much higher standard. I have also found that, with
the implementation of the Uniform Juvenile Court Act, our procedures
are becoming much more uniform. We do have Judge Eugene Burdick
in Williston who is on the National Commission for Uniform Laws,
and he met with the group who drafted and developed this Uniform
Juvenile Court Act. He has been very helpful to the rest of the district
judges in this state in developing uniform forms for our use, and
I know that this has improved our situation greatly in North Dakota.
The matter of attorneys was mentioned by our speaker. I believe
it is safe to say in Grand Forks County now, that almost 75% of all
juveniles, when they get to the stage of a petition alleging delin-
quency or unruliness, request court-appointed counsel if their parents
are not financially able to furnish an attorney. We, as a matter of
course, make this appointment under the Gault decision. This, I
believe, is a great improvement over the pre-In re Gault days when
you would have the State's Attorney or his assistant and the Juvenile
Commissioner on one side of the table with, I might add, the welfare
department people, and on the other side, the juvenile and maybe
one parent, two if he were lucky, to try to represent him in this
court proceeding. Since the Uniform Juvenile Court Act, the Gault
decision and the Miranda19 decision, that has been changed dras-
tically because now we routinely appoint counsel to represent these
juveniles who are charged with either unruliness or delinquency.
I do not have the statistics to go into the matter our speaker
discussed on what is the lawyer's position at the time of trial. Of
course, every lawyer has a different attitude as to what is in the best
interests of the child, that is as to recommending an admission
or to stand on every technicality that he can possibly find. I have
had experiences both ways. I would say this though-that if an at-
torney takes the tough position, to stand on every technicality that
he can find, to object to the admission of any statement unless there
is an absolute compliance with the Miranda warnings, then the situ-
ation goes back somewhat to what it was before In re Gault when
the judge had to take the burden upon himself and just decide whether
or not he feels in the circumstances he should let this evidence in.
19: Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 486 (1966).
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Of course, there is always the risk of reversal on appeal when that
is done, but then the ball is passed back again to the attorney. These
points were very interesting to me when the matter was opened
here. If you have any questions, I will be glad to do what I can
after the other speakers.
MRS. HAGA: As social workers, we sometimes get the juvenile
after he has already been through the process that you people have
already talked about, namely adjudication; we very often come in
on disposition. There are a few things that I am concerned about
with the advent of attorneys to the court system in which, up until
now, we have maybe felt a kind of vested interest. But from what
I have seen and heard stated about the juvenile's conception of
justice and how important it is for the juvenile to feel that he has
been dealt with fairly in a courtroom, I think this is necessary. I
am not willing to see a child who is innocent institutionalized, nor
do I think he should be put on probation. I think that even this is a
form of taking away some of his rights, namely that he at least
has to appear in person on certain days at certain times where he
would otherwise be able to follow his own course of action.
It has been mentioned that absent due process of law, even a
child who has violated the law may not feel he has been justly
treated and goes on to resist rehabilitation by the court, where we,
as social workers come into the picture. If a child is malleable, as
Mr. Stapleton suggests-and I would offer that if this were not true,
then social work as a profession would rapidly go out of business-
what about his feeling of justice if he is removed from the court
on a technicality? Does this not often distort a child's sense of
justice? I feel that it may: I also think that it is going to be up to
lawyers in the juvenile court system to determine in what frame
of reference we do get these children if they are committed by the
court. In other words, I would hope the attorney would not go in
saying "I'm going to get you off if I can; I know you did it and you
know you did it; but maybe they did not follow the proper procedure
when you were arrested"-the child, as I understand it, may on cer-
tain technicalities be released. I am wondering if saying this to a
child, or the manner in which it is presented, is not going to say to
the child that if you are found under the jurisdiction of the court,
you will receive punishment; in other words, it is putting a punitive
aspect on what the court tries to do with these children once they
are adjudicated delinquent.
Having worked in a court system, I find it hard enough to work
with kids who are there with some idea of why they are there, without
having to come in with the idea that maybe they just did not
get an attorney who worked hard enough for them, or that the at-
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torney gave them the idea that the thing to do really would be
to get them off. I think that how hard our job is going to be once
these children are adjudicated is up to these people in the courtroom.
I understand-although I have not worked in the courts since In re
Gault has been passed, except for a couple of sessions-that social
workers who are there find it very different than it was previously.
I, for one, have learned very well what the hearsay rule is. I seem
to have used it an awful lot before this-hearsay, that is. I am not
sure this is wrong. I would like, I think, to see lawyers in our juvenile
court system. I think a child does have rights and these should be
protected; but I cannot say that the guilty child, even though it is
known that he is guilty, should be released from juvenile court juris-
diction unless-and I hope this is not true and I think we do have
to do something about it as Mr. Stapleton suggests-our treatment
procedure, what we do for a child, is not valid. In that case, there
may be no use referring any child for treatment but I would offer
that there are methods. I think we have to look into them a little
more closely. I do, not think it is enough any more to say "it worked,
so let us do it again," whether we know why it works or not. I think
we have to take more responsibility, maybe in the nature of a study
such as has been done in treatment with juveniles, testing the differ-
ent types of methods and why they worked or why they did not.
I think the disciplines and the courts are also going to have to address
themselves to that, if the juvenile court system is going to continue
to operate. There is no use referring the child for treatment if the
treatment is not there to be had. I think it is unfortunate that many
people say of our institutions, "better leave them in a home, any
kind of a home, than an institution." From some of the institutions
I have seen, I think I would almost go along with this; however, I
would have to say that I do not think this is the way it has to be.
To go back to my original point, I think it is going to make
a difference to us, who get the children after they have been through
the courtroom, how other people, especially the attorneys who defend
them, are going to put forth what the juvenile court can do or
will do to them. I hope that you will present it at least this positively:
that if they do not get off on a technicality that there is something
to offer in the court system for the child's rehabilitation.
If there are any questions afterward, I would be more than happy
to try to answer them.
MR. TEITELBAUM: Let me begin by conceding that I feel
slightly uncomfortable in defending the Gault decision indirectly
since, as a number of persons here know, I have taken the opportunity
from time to time to criticize it. But since it is Mr. Stapleton's ox
that is being gored and not mine, I feel free to switch grounds.
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One could discuss Mr. Stapleton's analysis of the Gault decision
in some detail, but because the hour hand is sweeping on, I think
that I will leave that and go directly to his very challenging proposal
for experiment. As I understand it, the idea is to divide all delin-
quency cases into three groups. These groups are defined in terms
of the attorney's posture when the client has admitted his involvement
in the alleged offense to his lawyer. In 50 of these cases the accused
may resist state intervention by use of adversarial defense tactics.
In another 50 the lawyer is enjoined to admit the child's involvement.
At this point the lawyer may urge upon an evaluation team or
teams some dispositional scheme. If the dispositional scheme which
the lawyer desires is not available at this time, the lawyer may
and should take steps to secure that program for his client. In
the last group of 50 the attorney would play no active role whatsoever
after entering an admission.
The first of these schemes is consistent with the adversarial de-
fense as it is known in criminal cases. The last of these is in
keeping with the traditional juvenile court practice in those cases
where the child has admitted his guilt. The middle one, taken with
the other two, is a new and very challenging one.
There are, I think, substantial difficulties with. Mr. Stapleton's
experimental proposition. Its major justification lies, of course, in the
fact that it provides a design by which the benefits of various
approaches to behavioral, abnormality can be assessed with some
rigor. At the same time I take it that it is perfectly clear that the
securing of socially, useful information, however desirable, is limited,
by other norms or values and that there are instances in which
ideological or ethical norms outweigh empirical interest. To take
only one example: I. presume that the best way to determine the
tolerance of human bodies for falls is to take human bodies and
drop them in controlled states-25 feet, 50 feet, 75 feet, 100 feet. Of
course, this is "horrible"; nevertheless it is perfectly clear that the
design which I have described is the best and perhaps the only way
of testing this particular question. I hope it is clear that an experi-
ment of this sort, while perhaps yielding socially useful information,
is forbidden by other norms which define the place of the individual
in society.
There is, then, a fundamental question whether the empirical
gain in any experiment is outweighed by other societal values. Under-
lying Mr. Stapleton's scheme is a simple but very important propo-
sition. It clearly and necessarily denies the existence of any right on
the part of the admittedly guilty child to resist societal intervention.
The fact that a part of the class-the 50 who have the adversarial
lawyer-can set up the various defenses allowed under the law
of the land does not mean that children as a group have the right
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to resist intervention. After all, I take it that one cannot claim
something as a right if its exercise depends solely upon random
assignment, rather than on something which inheres in one's individu-
ality or personality. The individual's posture vis-a-vis authority in
Mr. Stapleton's proposition is determined solely by the cast of a
die and not by anything in the relationship of the individual to
the state.
Would this cost be accepted if the subject were an adult and the
system were the criminal process? I take it that the logic of Mr.
Stapleton's analysis suggests that the answer would be in the affir-
mative. Lawyers, however, resist that suggestion because it funda-
mentally changes the relationship of the individual and society. The
criminal process takes as a basic assumption the conflict of interest
between the state, which seeks to act upon the individual, and the
individual's interest in avoiding the consequences of that action.
Like all conflict systems, the norms and rules by which this conflict
is to be resolved are carefully established and rigorously enforced.
These procedures are, in a very real sense, as important as the
outcome of the confrontation. Thus, if I am charged with a crime
and you are the state, I am entitled to say: "You, as the state, may
not act upon me against my will until you have satisfied certain pre-
requisites to that intervention, such as proof beyond a reasonablle
doubt and proof by evidence which has been obtained in a consti-
tutionally permissible fashion." In short, the criminal system posits
the right of the defendant to challenge all official exertions of authority
at every stage of the procedure. He need not do so, but he may
do so. In the words of the Attorney General's Committee on Poverty
and the Administration of Federal Criminal Justice, "the essence of
the adversary system is challenged. The survival of our system of
criminal justice and the values it advances depends upon a constant
searching and creative questioning of official decisions and assertions
of authority at every stage of the process. The adversary system is
the institution devised by our legal order for the proper reconciliation
of our public and private interests in the crucial areas of penal
regulation. As such it makes essential and invaluable contributions
to the maintenance of a free society. ' 20 I take it, that it follows
from this that if a state were to staff a prison and to give it
a rehabilitative orientation, as indeed has been suggested and at
most attempted, it nevertheless follows that the defendant could
invoke his right as an individual to resist authoritative intervention
in his career-even though that intervention be assertedly helpful
rather than harmful, from the State's point of view.
20. Report of the Attorney General's Committee on Poverty and the Administration of
Federal Criminal Justice 11 (1963); See also Skolnick, Social Control in the Adversary
Systen, 11 J. CONFL. REs. 52 (1967).
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If experimentation of this sort is impermissible in the criminal
forum, is the cost substantially less when the subject is a child and
the forum a juvenile court? This question, I would submit, is one
of political philosophy rather than of empirical knowledge. To some
extent, I suppose the juvenile court movement has assumed that
delinquency proceedings are cooperative rather than conflict organi-
zations, since the hearing is said to be "in the interest of" and not
"against" the child.21 Of course, this merely assumes the entire
question away. We may concede that, for some legal purposes,
children have a dependent rather than an independent status. I am
not about to say that a 14 year old has the same rights and respon-
sibilities as an adult. But the proper issue is whether, for this
purpose, children can be denied a measure of distance from the
state in the name of research. This is in large part the same
question which has faced, though without recognition and with a dif-
ferent focus, juvenile courts since their inception. And this question
must be faced and answered before Mr. Stepleton's test tubes can
be filled.
Let me make one last point; I make it separately because it
is relatively minor and specific. Part of the evaluational suggestion
put forth by Mr. Stapleton in his second proposition might involve
the following situation. Let us suppose for the sake of argument
that I represented C. W. and C. W. admits his guilt to me. As the
facts suggested by Mr. Stapleton indicate, there are no adequate
facilities available for handling C. W. in the jurisdiction. I take
it that under his plan, I still must admit guilt, but I must then af-
firmatively seek legal action to secure the needed rehabilitative
scheme. In the first place, there may be no legal remedy at all.
The decision to use state funds for the construction of an institution
is a legislative decision and cannot, so far as I know, be compelled
by judicial action. The usual remedy for inadequate treatment is
not construction of a new facility but release on habeas corpus. 2
This alternative, however, clearly subverts the purpose of Mr. Staple-
ton's proposition.
Secondly, the legal action will, in many cases, do nothing for
the client on whose behalf it is urged. Introduction, discussion, pas-
sage of a bill, appropriation of funds, and then construction of
a physical facility takes time-a lot of time. By the time the building
is finally up and staff is hired and the doors are opened, C. W. may
well have spent several years in industrial school, have been released,
have achieved his majority, and be wholly without the authority of
the juvenile court. Thus by implication the attorney's role is defined
21. See State v. Scholl, 167 Wis. 504, 167 N.W. 830 (1918).
22. E.g., Rouse v. Cameron, 373 F.2d 461 (D.C.CIr. 1966) ; See generally Symposium:
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in terms of some future good to be achieved for persons not his
clients, but arguably at the expense of the client whom he represents
in this case. This, I suggest, is a novel and somewhat troublesome
definition of the role of the attorney.
QUESTION: What do you do in the situation where the lawyer
is fully convinced that the juvenile has committed a crime but
the juvenile has not admitted it, or what do you do in the situation
where the juvenile admits the crime but the lawyer is convinced
that he is admitting a crime that he did not commit, which I think
you will concede happens. Why do you exclude them from your
program?
MR. STAPLETON: For the sake of simplicity, I suggested the
plan described tonight because it presents the very clear problem
of the known guilty who are going free; this is a logical class with
which to commence experimentation. Now I am going to start sound-
ing like the classic Nazi surgeon who is experimenting with frozen
bodies. In the instance that I suggested, I am worried about C. W. as
an individual person and as a political man. As a member of the ex-
perimenting society-and I suggest that the experimenting society
is a rational society, because if you do not have more certain
knowledge than what we now go on, you are going on guesswork-
I argue that more certain knowledge is better than no knowledge
whatsoever. A logical extension of my design would reach all such
cases; indeed this project evolved out of a program where I, as the
Inquisitor General, randomly assigned cases to project attorneys.
In other words, the clients that were assigned to our attorneys
were free to turn down those attorneys, but their initial assignment
to our attorneys, whose case loads were very low and who had been
specially prepared in juvenile court law and were especially enjoined
to present an adversarial defense, was not up to the juvenile, or the
court, or the attorney-it was made by a process which removes
such decision from all human error.
QUESTION: You recognize the fact that you are removing the
guilt-determining process from the court to an individual.
MR STAPLETON: In the design that I propose tonight? Yes.
But I say that the Gault decision has done that anyway. It has placed
an unconscionable dual role on the attorney, one that the court had
to assume before. Now the attorney has to take over. If the attorney
is cast in the classic adversarial role, in the classic adversarial
posture of Clarence Darrow, he is going to go in there and fight tooth
and nail for his client. But there are many attorneys now practicing
in juvenile court who now take the opposite approach and who indeed
say that, in the case of C. W., it would be his affirmative obligation
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to admit the charge. What I am suggesting is an experimental pro-
gram that would provide affirmative information on the most useful
role from a certain perspective.
QUESTION: I read somewhere that in the Far East there is
a custom of helping beggars, but the person who helps the beggar
becomes responsible for him with the result that he permanently is
in his charge. Are you asking this attorney who makes this vigorous
adversary defense to assume the role of the person who helps the
beggars, and be responsible for his juvenile until the matter is
ultimately resolved?
MR. STAPLETON: In one-third of the cases I would like to
see this tried, if not by the attorney alone, at least by the attorney
in conjunction with either a probation worker, a social worker,
or with a team of social scientists. And again I base this proposition
on something that Mrs. Haga has emphasized - that we firmly
believe that children are malleable. If children are not malleable,
if we did not believe that they could be socialized into the framework
of our social system, then it is all for naught, this whole question
becomes moot and this whole symposium is nonsensical. But we do
adopt the proposition that children are mallelable, even up to the age
of 25 and 30.
MR. TEITELBAUM: Let me say that I do- not see anything,
particularly inconsistent between the classic attorney's role and' the
assumption of additional- responsibility. It may be that an attorney
can find suitable resources in the community for his client. If. he can;
it seems to me that. the only obstacle to pursuing this. end- may,
be one of time. Certainly nothing in his role forbids- him from-
seeking to secure the services of the community for his client. Indeed
I suspect a good, number of lawyers in many instances do just that;
it is just simply that they do not choose to submit their client to
the jurisdiction of, the state for this purpose.
QUESTION: Mr. Stapleton, when you experiment I would like
to know what your objective is, generally speaking-because as I
understand the juvenile system the juvenile delinquent does not
necessarily, as it stands today, have to be a "criminal." He could
be guilty of committing an act which, if committed by an adult,
would not necessarily be a crime, such as breaking curfew. How do
you equate your experiment in relation to these factors as far as
juvenile delinquency is concerned?
MR. STAPLETON: In the ideal experimental design we have
enough individuals so that these factors can be taken into account
by statistical analysis. What I am looking for in terms of concrete re-
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suits are a number of indices which I call upon you to help me create
let us say rates of recidivism. A juvenile convicted of delinquency
is not a criminal, and I suggest that we provide for the expungement
of that record. At the same time we can keep tabs on that juvenile
since juveniles do have records, and we find out rates of recidivism-
either by further referral to the police department or further referral
to the courts, also further referral to the criminal courts, if he should
get into later trouble.
An experimental design divides up the population in such a
way that you have a number of groups, each of which can be com-
pared to one another. Let's say that the design that I presented
tonight, that of design 2, the one that Mr. Teitelbaum finds so objec-
tionable from a legal point of view, shows an affirmative result
in lowering rates of recidivism and, on certain psychological scales,
the children so treated show greater maturity after a length of time
and greater intellectual development-then would this not be suf-
ficient evidence to indicate to the ABA Committee on Ethics that
this be the preferred ethical standard for lawyers in juvenile courts?
In other words, are behavioral indices relevant in the study of
juveniles? Classically they have been. The Supreme Court seems
to rely on behavioral indices in making its decisions. And if the
Supreme Court is going to leap in with both feet that way, then I
submit it is up to me as a social scientist to come back with both
feet from my perspective. And I am offering the kind of design
that permits this. Indeed, I agree with Mr. Justice Harlan's dissent
where he argues that the full imposition of constitutional rights, and
I quote from him, "may inadvertantly have served to discourage
these very efforts to find more satisfactory solutions for the problems
of juvenile crime and may thus now hamper enlightenend develop-
ment of the systems of juvenile courts. 2 3 So at least one Justice
agrees with my position.
J. BAKKEN: I perhaps should have added that in the Uniform
Juvenile Court Act the initial procedure is what is called "an informal
adjustment" and this is handled strictly by the juvenile supervisor.24
Of course, you go to the qualifications of the juvenile supervisor in
that case, but if your juvenile supervisor is trained in the psychology
of social work, the fields you are referring to, it seems to me
that at that point the present set-up in this state gives some of what
Mr. Stapleton has suggested. The next step is what is referred to
as a "referee's hearing," although this I admit gets more to the
legal phase again, because to be a referee under the act the person
23. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 65, 77 (1967) (Harlan, T., concurring In part and dissent-
ing in part).
24. N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-20-10 (Supp. 1969),
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is required to be a lawyer.2 5 But both procedures are used before
you get to a formal petition and a hearing in juvenile court. The
juvenile does not get into juvenile court before the juvenile judge
under either of these proceedings and the juvenile supervisor and
the referree (of course these are cases where there usually is an ad-
mission of guilt) has authority to set up the treatment of rehabilita-
tion procedures that he feels are in the best interests of the juvenile.
MR. TEITELBAUM: Let me suggest what I think are a couple
of distinctions between the procedure that Judge Bakken has just
described under the Uniform Juvenile Court Act and Mr. Stapleton's
proposition. As I read the Uniform Juvenile Court Act, which, of
course, is now enacted in North Dakota, informal adjustment cannot
result in incarceration. 26 Similarly, I believe even a referee's finding
cannot result in incarceration unless certified by the district judge.2 7
Under Mr. Stapleton's proposition, I take it, this quasi-administrative
or quasi-judicial body (I am not quite sure which) has power to order
'commitment or whatever treatment seems called for. That distinc-
tion seems to me fundamental.
MR. STAPLETON: Yes, you are right; I firmly agree.
J. BAKKEN: I would like to ask Mr. Stapleton what his views
are on the right to trial by jury. The Supreme Court is wrestling
with that proposition right now 28 and, of course, that would take this
Gault matter further down the primrose path.
MR. STAPLETON: My views are that of a classic social sci-
entist; and as you might guess, I propose an experimental program.
We can set up for a year in a given jurisdiction a certain number
of cases that are tried by jury and a certain number of cases
that are tried under the classical method. Then we find out what
the outcomes are. With this experimental program, I then can provide
you, future legislators in the body politic, with more certain knowl-
edge about what to do. So I would ask the Supreme Court to withhold
its decision if it is going to base its decision on social science
fact, for more certain knowledge in this area.
MR. TEITELBAUM: I was simply wondering whether or not
Mr. Stapleton was volunteering his brothers in the sociological pro-
fession as the defendants in these trial cases?
MR. STAPLETON: Fortunately we are not juveniles, if we are
brothers in the sociological profession.
25. N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-20-07 (Supp. 1969).
26. See N.D. CErT. CODE § 27-20-10(1) & (2) (Supp. 1969).
27. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-20-07(6) (Supp. 1969).
28. In re Burrus, No. 128 (October Term, 1970).
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QUESTION: I thought Professor Teitelbaum's first objection
was to the design of the experiment. But, after understanding
that the results of the experiment would permit the American Bar
Association to alter its Code of Professional Ethics as it applies to
juveniles, it seems to me your principal problem is one of further
extension. It seems to me we do not have to limit it to juvenile cases;
we might very well have the same situation applied to the criminal
courts - after all, we also regard adults as malleable to a large
extent. Why not see what the effect would be of having an experiment
in which lawyers were compelled to withdraw if they came to the
conclusion that their criminal defendants were, in fact, guilty, and
see what effect that would have on the crime rate? It seems to me
that this would clearly indicate that the effect on the system is not
the only consideration, and perhaps this is the force to Professor
Teitelbaum's objection. I admit that this is something more of a
statement than a question, but could you please expand on that?
MR. STAPLETON: First of all, I do believe that a rigorous
reading of the Gault decision indicates that it was based largely
on sociological factors; the Court had to go a long way to show that
the juvenile court process did not work. Professor Teitelbaum's
objection are, I think, well taken in terms of protection of the norms
of the Americian judicial system. At the same time, these very
norms are now being called into question by people who would
like to do away with certain number of them. I think that there are
good arguments to be made on both sides. My experimenting society
I call one of staged reforms, in which your design for lawyers
withdrawing from certain cases where they have certain knowledge
of guilt would be perfectly rational if permitted by the judiciary or
by the legislators, so that we could experiment. Unfortunately, we
get involved with people's rights in such experiments; and, therefore,
we are not allowed to experiment. Concrete experiments have been
done-the Vra bail bond study involved a privilege, not a right;
and provided concrete results which led to the new release on recog-
nizance rule in New York and a number of other states. That
was a pure experimental design where a certain number of individu-
als were denied the privilege of release on recognizance and a certain
number of individuals were given that privilege. But it came out
with concrete results, and once the results were out the experiment
ended and positive legislative action was then taken.
QUESTION for Mr. Teitelbaum: Since Mr. Stapleton is advocat-
ing going between two extremes-the pre-Gault and the post-Gault
extremes-what is so offensive about doing the experiment he is
suggesting in view of the fact that an admitted criminal, generally
speaking, in the United States, is supposed to owe his body to the
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state to do with whatever the state wills. If you commit a felony,
if you murder somebody, if you commit an atrocious crime in the
United States, you forfeit your body through incarceration, generally
speaking; that is, if you have admitted and been proved guilty. If
you say a person owes a debt to society; that is, he has committed
an offense and he owes a debt to society, what is so terrible about
going back to pre-Gault law to come up with a solution that is
based on scientific facts that can be verified.
MR. TEITELBAUM: The hooker in your statement is in the
change of language. In your initial statement you said that an
admitted felon owes his body to the state. Upon reflection, I am sure
you will agree with me that this is not the law and has never
been the law, if you are referring to non-judicial admissions, as
Mr. Stapleton is. If, however, guilt is judicially established, whether
on his plea or not, I take it that-still within normative limits-the
state may act upon an individual. There is, of course, a constitutional
injunction against cruel and unusual punishment and things of that
nature. The fact, however, that guilt has to be proved indicates
something about the relationship between the individual and society.
Before society can act on me, it must go through certain procedures
which form a buffer between society and my individuality and free-
dom. Until it has done so, the state is disabled from acting upon me.
I insist that this is essentially a judgment of political philosophy.
MR. STAPLETON: A short reply to Mr. Teitelbaum's remarks.
I would assume 'that :you would not consider that state action in
requiring juveniles to go to school is at all coercive or the juveniles
perceive it as being coercive.
MR. TEITELBAUM: I assume it is and they may.
MR. STAPLETON: Why not grant rights of due process to
juveniles in terms of :appealing decisions by state school boards to
send them to school?
MR. TEITELBAUM: I consider that . .
MR. STAPLETON: I mean, the state does interfere in juvenile
lives.
MR. TEITELBAUM: I do not contest that for a moment; nor
does it deter me that that may properly be termed coercive. There
are lots of areas in which both adults and juveniles are coerced in
circumstances which do not require the application of the due process
requirements which exist in criminal prosecutions. However, this is
something of a sliding scale. The more you interfere with liberty,
I take it, the more likely that procedures of a certain sort are
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appropriate, and that was my point. The question really is what
process is due here, not whether any process is due.
QUESTION for Mr. Stapleton: You recognized that there were
certain normative values that in a very real way interfered with
your experimental society. As I understood you, you said that these
are values that are set by institutions in our society, by the legis-
latures. Are there any normative values for you as an individual
and a social scientist that interfere with the experimental society
that you would posit as being of a higher value and, if so, what are
they?
MR. STAPLETON: You have put a question I have wanted to
answer all evening. There are certain normative values which I
follow. They are the normative values of science. I will state the
two principal fundamental hypotheses coming from Karl Popper,
a very distinguished philosopher of science: First, "the game of
science is in principle without end. He who decides that one day
scientific statements do not call for any further test and that they
can be regarded as finally verified retires from that game." As a
social scientist, I do not intend to retire from that game. Statements
from me are always open to be verified or disqualified on the
basis of certain fundamental tests. Secondly, "once a hypothesis has
been proposed and tested and has proved its mettle, it may not be
allowed to drop out without good reason. ' 29 A good reason may be,
for instance, replacement of a hypothesis with another which is
better testable or the falsification of one of the consequences of the
hypothesis. In effect, I am arguing, I suppose, for a 1984-ish type
of society, in which, if you will cast me in the role of the devil, that
social scientists and lawyers-the knowledgeable people-are going
to be in a position to impose upon the body politic a set of programs
of rational reform whereby we can decide what is the best effect,
the best test, and then put that into full scale effect at a later
time. I think that such programs, if implemented in the past, would
have prevented such monstrous disasters as public housing programs,
public welfare scandals and the rest of the problems that we are
faced with in our increasingly socialized society.
QUESTION: There are no other independent normative values
for you.
MR. STAPLETON: No
QUESTION: Is science necessarily a game?
MR. STAPLETON: Let us term this as rhetoric. Science as
29. K. R. PoPPER, THE LOGIC OF SCIENTIFIC DISCOVERY 53-54 (1961).
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science; the study of science. It is the game of science insofar as
we all play games-you play the game as a lawyer, you play the
game as a social worker, you play the game as a student. The propo-
sition might be restated: "The role of science"-let us substitute
the word role for game in this sense-"The role of science is in
principle without end and he who decides one day that scientific
statements do not call for any further test he retires from the game."
QUESTION: In view of Mr. Stapleton's statement, which is
valid-that the juvenile has a very malleable mind-I would like to
know at what age you would have the cut-off between juvenile
and adult.
MR. STAPLETON: If you want to adopt my rationale to
its bloody and bitter end-to the age of 90, because all people
are malleable and certain research has indicated that the processes
of socialization do not stop at any given age. We learn throughout
our lives, both as children and as adults. I am advocating the ex-
perimenting society for all people; that is why I agreed earlier that
the experimenting society I hypothesized earlier for the juvenile
court can and should be applied to the criminal model as well.
JUDGE BAKKEN: I think I draw my conclusions from the
experience that I have had, and that is that even though the act
sets the age at 18,30 which is really a reduction from our original
21-year old statute, as a practical matter very few juveniles, either
girls or boys, are given rehabilitation or treatment under the dispo-
sition hearing after .delinquency or unruliness has been determined
over the age of 17. The impression I get is that when they become
17 or approaching 18, say 171/2, if there is any prior record, there
is a waiver requested and they go into adult court, on the feeling
that the malleable stage has been passed, so far as the alternatives
are concerned for treatment under the present setup.
MRS HAGA: My feeling is that the personality remains mal-
leable. I think maybe it reduces somewhat in this respect, but-
I do not think I can give a point at which this is going to stop.
MR. TEITELBAUM: If I have to give numbers, which I
guess you are asking for, I would say between the ages of 10
and 17, assuming you are speaking of delinquency jurisdiction. If
you are asking for a rationale for either number, I cannot give you
one. The upper age limit and the lower age limit should depend in
large part on facilities available. There is no point in having a 7 year
old juvenile delinquent who cannot usefully be placed in any institution
30. N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-20-02(1) (a) (Supp. 1969).
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in the state. You may treat him as neglected or dependent; that is,
as something other than delinquent, but do not treat him as delinquent
if you can do absolutely nothing. I picked 17 because it is between
16 and 18.
QUESTION: Mrs. Haga in her remarks said that she was dis-
turbed by an attorney's role in getting the child off. Do you see
this as the attorney's role?
MR. TEITELBAUM: I can avoid the question wholly by saying
it depends on the child's preferred position. But let us assume
the case in which I have reason to believe, because he told me and
there is corroborative evidence, that the child did in fact commit the
offense alleged. Let us also assume this child is quite adamant that
he has no desire at all to undergo the rehabilitative treatment of
the court. I take it, then, that my role is to offer him every defense
the law allows-every one-because I insist that is his right before
the juvenile court.
Let me also respond to a phrase that was tossed around from
time to time, and that is the idea of getting people off on legal tech-
nicalities. Now I assume that a "legal technicality" is nothing more
than a rule which happens to be inconvenient or unattractive at the
moment to the person making the characterization. I do not assume
that the privilege against self-incrimination is a technicality. History
indicates that it is " of the essence of our scheme of ordered liberty"-
not to coin a phrase. I take it that dismissal of the case because
of the failure of the state to produce any competent evidence whatso-
ever-which is, after all, the precise situation in the C. W. case-is
not a technicality. It goes to the ability of the state to perform
its duty when it seeks to act authoritatively upon an individual.
QUESTION for Mr. Teitelbaum and Mr. Stapleton: It has been
mentioned tonight that the next step the Supreme Court will take
for juveniles will be trial by jury. If they go to trial by jury, Mr.
Teitelbaum, would you as an attorney like to see the jury consist
of peers of the juvenile: if so, why or why not. I would ask the same
question to Mr. Stapleton as a sociologist-would you want children
to be their jury?
MR. STAPLETON: As a sociologist, I would want to put it
to the test, of course, but my gut feeling would be that a jury of
peers would probably be far tougher on their contemporaries than
a jury of adults. This has been the case in quasi-penal and penal
institutions for juveniles where juries have been set up for trying
infractions of rules within those institutions. It turns out that juveniles
are pretty harsh on their own contemporaries. If you want leniency
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as a standard, I suggest a jury of adults. If you want harshness as a
standard, I suggest a jury of juveniles.
MR. TEITELBAUM: Just to prove that Mr. Stapleton and I
can work well together, I agree very much on this point. I do not
think that I would like to put a client before a jury of his peers,
because I think, quite frankly, they would hang him. I would much
rather have an older jury.
QUESTION: How do you view punishment toward the juvenile?
Do you feel that punishment, in other words, incarceration, rather
than treatment would be beneficial to the child?
MR. STAPLETON: I think that I have to refer to Margaret
Q. Warren's studies in California31 They indicate that, for certain
types of individuals (she identifies something like 10 or 11 maturity
levels of development) punishment serves a positive value; that
certain types of juveniles cannot respond to rational authority but
do respond to coercive authority far better than they do under any
other system. Anecdotal evidence comes from my experience as a
parent where we have three systems of justice in the home, two
of which operate at this time. One is "mommy justice" which is
appealable-to daddy. "Daddy justice" is nonappealable. Then
there is abstract justice. My children are not old enough for abstract
justice; therefore punishment tends to become a norm which is
presumably used for a ,social good.
QUESTION: I will preface this by saying I do not really believe
your statement -at :the beginning of your talk, Mr. Stapleton, that
you suffer from the .disability, if that is the .proper word, of being
unfamiliar with juvenile philosophy and the study of law. When you
are talking :about legal -technicalities, I do not think you really intend
to suggest that this ,is a legal bag of tricks that the lawyer uses, so
he can collect his money from his client. Indeed, these legal rules
reflect a long -history, with many instances of empirical support
that shows they 'have a place in the truth-determining process. Sec-
ondly, these rules reflect a judicial decision that they are necessary
in order to enforce sanctions created by our society, either through
the legislature or through the Constitution, against illegal government
action. The courts have been very reluctant to form that second set
of rules and have only done so on the basis that this is the only
way to enforce governmental limits. Does not the juvenile as well
as the adult have the right to this protection and would you not say
it is necessary for him to feel he is being dealt with fairly;
that one of the real advantages of using this lawyer's bag of tricks
31. Warren, Supra n. 11.
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is that the court recognizes, and the client hopefully will recognize,
that the state cannot use illegal action in order to convict him even
if he did in fact commit the crime?
MR. STAPLETON: First of all, that statement must be foot-
noted. Obviously legal technicalities are not technicalities, as recog-
nized by both you and Mr. Teitelbaum. Nevertheless, the statement
was made on purpose, because it is a statement that is used again
and again by juvenile court judges in this nation's courts and by
social workers to indicate a certain distrust of the lawyer's bag
of tricks. After all, when you take a look at the Zenith 19 it does
seem, if you are an outsider, that it is a bag of tricks. You have got
a crippled witness who cannot make it into court; and perhaps
the state's attorney in this particular jurisdiction is too lazy to go
out and take a statement from her or to provide ambulance service
to get her down to court. Nevertheless, the lawyer, it seems to me,
is under some sort of injunction, a moral duty perhaps, if he could
forget the Code of Ethics of the American Bar Association for the
minute, to the protection of the society norm and to the norm of
treatment of the individual. These norms are in constant conflict
at all times and you are protecting yourselves, both you and Mr.
Teitelbaum and the other hard-core lawyers, behind a code of ethics
which recognizes only one system. Now the European penal code
does not necessarily operate this way, if I understand it at all cor-
rectly.
QUESTION: Do you think it is ever possible to believe the no-
tion of guilt has no meaning in a particular context? For example,
a plea of guilty admits (1) the fact that I did the act, (2) that
the act is characterized as an offense under the law. Thus a lawyer
is quite free in suggesting to his client who did the act not to
plead guilty because a higher court might decide that the particular
fact, which is quite consistent with the attitude of the lawyer towards
his client's guilt in having him sing dumb.
MR STAPLETON: Under Mr. Teitelbaum's tutelage I was very
careful to exclude such cases as criminal trespass to auto which
requires knowledge on the participant's part that the auto was indeed
stolen. Each of the Zenith 19 involved an act which would typically
be characterized as a felony, in each it appeared that the child had
knowledge that he did do the act, did admit it to the lawyer,
and there was sufficient evidence to indicate that the act was
done. So that I have been, I think, reasonably careful in my socio-
logical analysis.
QUESTION: I am somewhat puzzled because I think I heard
Professor Stapleton say something to Professor Goldberg about some
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kind of a moral or ethical principle we should invoke when the
witness just happened to be off in a wheelchair someplace and could
not come in. Now this sounds to me like some kind of a normative
value beyond the scope of normative values that you as a social
scientist adopted earlier. From where are you drawing these, or are
these just applied to other people and not social scientists?
MR. STAPLETON: They apply to all people, but let us just
take it within the framework of the juvenile court where I have ob-
served, in another study, that four dominant normative themes carry
throughout cases from both judge's statements and lawyer's state-
ments. One is protection of the social order; we are concerned about
releasing criminals back on the streets because they might commit
some act which will injure somebody or do some harm to some thing.
The second normative value is the treatment of the individual himself
that there is a positive injunction upon the state to provide treatment
when the case can be proved. The third normative value is a bureau-
cratic norm; we want to get the case through and over with. The
fourth normative value is the due process model which, until Gault,
was not typically applied in juvenile courts. Now that this model
is applied to juvenile courts, I suggest that there is increasing
conflict among these norms, and conflict between normative values
produces the kind of role conflict which I suggest now rests heavily
upon the attorney. I am asking for a program, I am asking for sug-
gestions, whereby we can remove some of the role conflict which
now falls on the head of the attorney. Now if this can only be
provided by adopting the present standards of the American Bar
Association's Canons of Ethics, in other words "warm zeal" in the
defense of the client, then so be it. But I suggest if this judgment
be made on the basis of social science knowledge, then we had better
use social science knowledge. If it is to be made on the basis of a
normative principle, make it and I will live under it as a member
of the society. But you cannot, as Gault does, try to use social science
fact to back up normative values. That is like trying to decide
whether God exists or not on the basis of empirical evidence-and
that argument was had out a long time ago.
MODERATOR: Would any of the panelists care to make closing
remarks?
JUDGE BAKKEN: Well, I would like to say in defense of In
re Gault that the attorneys that have worked my court, have in my
judgment, given fair and adequate representation in the delinquency
part of the hearing. Under the Uniform Code there is a delinquency
hearing. If after that hearing is concluded, the juvenile is declared
delinquent we go into a separate hearing called a disposition hearing.
I believe that under Gault the attorneys have been a great aid to
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the court in suggesting alternatives. Once delinquency determination
has been made by the court the attorneys have been a great help
along with the social service workers in suggesting and furnishing
alternatives for treatment and rehabilitation. So all in all I feel that
the Gault decision was long overdue and I am happy to have it to
work under.
MR. TEITELBAUM: I should like to clear up two things
which I may have made obscure-which would not be at all unusual.
The first is that, while I have problems with Gault, I do not think
it is fundamentally wrong. I share Mr. Stapleton's reservations about
the way the Court characterized a good deal of the evidence it used.
However, I think that perhaps too much can be made of that. I do
not say Mr. Stapleton does, because I think all of his points were
well taken, but Gault can be viewed in another light.
If you start from the proposition that a juvenile is a "person,"
you may face the question of whether or not society can justify
according him lesser rights than an adult when both are faced with
incarceration for what may be a substantial period of time. If that
is the premise from which you begin, the burden of persuasion may
lie not on the opponents of the juvenile court movement as it was
traditionally constituted, but on the proponents of the system. In
that case, all that the Gault case may really be saying is that
the evidence offered by the proponents of the system with the lesser
guarantees is not persuasive. Indeed, the information available seems
to argue the other way. This is the posture of the case, the court
may still err in its characterization and appreciation of the social
science material that it uses, but that would not fundamentally
affect the decision made.
The second point is that I do not believe that social science is
inappropriate in studies of the legal system., My whole argument
has been that there are, however, norms which surround our legal
system which, in a number of instances, may say that certain kinds
of research are not permitted for ethical, ideological or political
reasons. That is not to say you cannot do useful research in any
circumstances; that is not even to say you cannot do it in a good
number of circumstances. It is simply to say that there is a point
at which the ideology of our society, of our political structure, de-
mands that you not act upon the individual even if the information
you would gain by so acting may be said to be socially useful.
MODERATOR: On behalf of the Student Bar Association and
the students who are present here, we thank each and every one
of you for a very informative evening.
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